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DOES IMMUNITY GRANTED REALLY
EQUAL IMMUNITY RECEIVED?
United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Hubbel' the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether the act of producing business records under
a subpoena qualified as testimonial evidence. The Court held
that the act was testimonial and, therefore, the prosecution un-
lawfully obtained an indictment based on documents that were
part of compelled production.'
The majority opinion identified two issues within the case:
(1) Whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a witness from be-
ing compelled to disclose the existence of incriminating documents that
the government is unable to describe with reasonable particularity; and
(2) if the witness produces such documents pursuant to a grant of im-
munity, whether 18 U.S.C. § 6002 prevents the Government from using
them to prepare criminal charges against him.
4
The Court decided that the Fifth Amendment does, in fact,
protect documents produced under those circumstances and
that the government violated the witness's immunity by using
them to prepare an indictment against him.5 This Note exam-
ines the growth of the approaches the Court used to address
these questions. This Note first argues that the Court correctly
decided both of these issues. However, while the Court's analy-
sis of Fifth Amendment protection produced the correct result,
the test it used is problematic. The concurring opinion put
forth a clearer, although broader, rule for determining if evi-
dence is protected by the Fifth Amendment.6 Additionally, this
Note asserts that not only did the Court properly decide the is-
sue of immunity, it did so following the clear, bright-line rule es-
' 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
2Id. at 2042-44.
3 Id. at 2048.
Id. at 2040.
'See id at 2048.
6 id. at 2050-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tablished in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.7 Following this
rule will enable future cases to be more easily decided.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment protects against the self-
incrimination of a defendant by providing that "[n] o person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."8 Though incorporated into one of the original
amendments in the Bill of Rights in 1791, 9 the privile e against
self-incrimination dates back to the thirteenth century. 0
The first well-documented case involving the protection
against self-incrimination came in England in 1637. In that
year, John Lilburne was arrested for "having sent seditious
books from Holland to England.""2 Lilburne was taken before a
clerk of the attorney-general and forced to answer questions
about his background and current actions. 3 Lilburne eventu-
ally refused to answer further questions regarding his past activi-
ties." Upon this decision, clerks informed Lilburne that
everyone took an "oath ex officio," which required witnesses to
testify in open court. 5 When taken before the King's Star
Chamber, Lilburne again refused to take the oath) Lilburne
was found in contempt of the court and imprisoned. 7 After two
years of imprisonment, Lilburne petitioned Parliament for his
release.'8 The House of Commons voted that Lilburne's sen-
7 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
'U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
'See U.S. CoNsT. Amend. I-X.
'0 MARK BERGER, TAIUNG THE FTFrH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SEU-INCRIMINATION 1 (1980).
" Id., at 15.
12 id.
1ird.
,4 Id. at 15-16.
"Id. An "oath ex officio" provided that "every person presented or indicted of any
heresy, or duly accused by two lawful witnesses, may be... committed to the ordinary [of
the church] to answer in open court." 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2250, at 277 (1961).
16 BERGER, supra note 10, at 17.
17 id.
'8 Id. at 17-18.
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tence was "illegal and against the liberty of the subject."'9 The
House of Lords ruled similarly.20 Shortly thereafter, the "oath
ex officio" was abolished from the ecclesiastical courts,2' thus
strengthening the right to protection from self-incrimination.
At approximately the same time that the English abolished
the "oath ex officio," colonists began settling in the American
Colonies. With the formation of the original states came the
formal inclusion of the privilege against self-incrimination in
the constitution or declaration of rights of eight of the fourteen
states.2 The colonial leaders were worried that common law
protection against self-incrimination would not be enough, and
therefore felt the need to include this "fundamental right" in a
written constitution.23 Each of these eight states with a bill of
rights used the word "evidence" instead of the word "witness,"
which would create a broader scope of protection.
The framers of the Constitution recognized the importance
of the self-incrimination protection doctrine and thus included
it in the four proposals for the Bill of Rights.? As a result of
these suggestions, James Madison wrote the Fifth Amendment,
substituting the word "witness" for the oft-used "evidence."z'
There was very little debate, in Congress or at the state legisla-
tures, on the inclusion of the self-incrimination privilege in the
Constitution and it was adopted unanimously, which exhibits its
importance.' What little deliberation there was suggested that




22 The original states that included a clause preventing self-incrimination in their
constitutions or declaration of rights were Virginia (1776), Pennsylvania (1776),
Delaware (1776), Maryland (1776), North Carolina (1776), Vermont (1777), Massa-
chusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1783). 120 S. Ct. at 2051-52. Four more of
the states did not include the privilege against self-incrimination in their constitutions
because they did not create a separate bill of rights, and instead relied solely on the
English common law protection. BERGER, supra note 10, at 22. The remaining to
states chose not to replace their original charter with a constitution, but still recog-
nized the common law privilege. Id.
" BERGR, supra note 10, at 22-23.
2' 120 S. Ct. at 2051-52 (citing 2 G.JAcOB, A NEW LAw-DcTIONARY (8th ed. 1762); 2
T. CUNNINGHAm, NEvAND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2 ed. 1771)).
25 Id.
"Id.
2 W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, & N. KING, CRmNAL PROcEDURE 290-91 (2d ed. 1999).
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"evidence" and "witness" were interchangeable.28 However, the
lack of debate also makes it difficult, and thus speculative, for
scholars to analyze Madison's intentions in changing the words
of the Fifth Amendment.
Although the original intent of the framers has been hard
to analyze, the courts have analyzed the Fifth Amendment in
many cases. Boyd v. United States is the first such case of major
significance. The issue in Boyd was whether the claimants would
be rejuired to produce an invoice for twenty-nine cases of plate
glass.3 In its holding, the Court found that forcing the defen-
dants to produce private papers and books was "compelling him
to be a witness against himself.31 Thus, the Court chose to in-
clude the production of documents within the self-
incrimination protection of the Fifth Amendment.
32
The Supreme Court made no significant decisions involving
the Fifth Amendment over the next eighty years, but it did re-
view numerous cases. Among these cases were Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia,33 United States v. Wade,3 and Gilbert v. California.35 All three
cases narrowed the scope of Fifth Amendment protection by al-
lowing the compelled production of a blood sample, 6 a voice
exemplar, and a handwriting sample, 8 respectively. These de-
cisions focused on the testimonial aspects of the evidence to de-
termine that they were not protected under the Fifth
Amendment. 9 However, none of the cases specifically defined
"testimonial evidence."40  None of these cases, however, over-
turned the holding of Boyd that defendants are not required to
produce self-incriminating documents."
LEONARD W. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE F=FH AMENDMENT, 424-25 (Oxford University
Press 1968).
29116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Id. at 618.
"Id. at 634-35. The Court also found that the requirement to produce the invoice
in this case violated the Forth Amendment as well. Id.
"See generally id.
"384 U.S. 757 (1966).
'4 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
"388 U.S. 263 (1967).
36 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
'7 See Wad, 388 U.S. at 222.
See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 277.
"Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772; Wade, 388 U.S. at 222; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 277.
'0 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772; Wade, 388 U.S. at 222; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 277.
" Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757; Wade 388 U.S. 218; Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263.
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In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. United Stated 2
and established a new standard for the Fifth Amendment. In
Fisher, the Court determined whether the government could
compel production from an accountant for his client's tax
documents.4 Though the Court primarily analyzed whether the
government could compel the production from the client's ac-
countant, it also looked at the question of whether the produc-
tion could be compelled of the defendants themselves."
Using the decisions in Schmerber, Gilbert, and Wade, the Fisher
court held that the Fifth Amendment only protects against the
production of "testimonial communication" and does not apply
to "every sort of incriminating evidence." It determined that
the three testimonial aspects of an act of production were exis-
tence, possession, and authenticity. 6 The Court decided that
producing the documents, and thereby admitting their exis-
tence and possession, would not rise to the level of testimony
under the Fifth Amendment.47 The Court further noted that
the tax papers requested by the government were of the kind
normally prepared by accountants." Therefore, "the existence
and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the
taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Govern-
ment's information by conceding that he in fact has the pa-
pers." 9 Since the government would have previous knowledge
of the existence and location of the documents before the de-
fendant produced the documents, the act of production would
not be considered testimonial.50 Though the Fisher Court re-
fused to officially overrule Boyd, it distinguished Boyd on the
ground that documents in question in Boyd were "private pa-
pers," whereas the documents in Fisherwere not the defendant's
own records.5
More recently, the Supreme Court has attempted to further
clarify the scope of protection under the Fifth Amendment. In
42 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
0 Id. at 393.
41 Id. at 405.
'5 Id. at 408.
46 Id. at 410-11.
7 Id. at 411.
'8 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
49 Id.
5DId.
51 Id. at 414.
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United States v. Doe ('Doe 1,),52 the Court analyzed two questions:
(1) whether the contents of the documents produced were
privileged and (2) whether the act of producing the documents
may be privileged.53 After deciding that the records themselves
were not privileged,54 the Court held that the act of production
was privileged." The Court relied, in part, on the District
Court's finding that the act of production entailed testimonialS • 56
self-incrimination. The Court ruled that production of the
documents could have been compelled; however, "use" immu-
nity would have to be granted for all potentially incriminating
evidence.57 Thus, the prosecution would be prevented from us-
ing any "incriminatory aspects of the act of production" in fu-
ture prosecutions.
In Doe v. United States ("Doe IT')," the government suspected
the defendant was committing fraud and tax violations 9 In or-
der to get his bank records, the government filed a motion for
the Court to require Doe to sign twelve consent forms that
would give the banks authority to turn over the records to the
government.Y The Court held that self-incrimination protec-
tion under the Fifth Amendment "may be asserted only to resist
compelled explicit or implicit disclosures of incriminating in-
formation. Historically, the privilege was intended to prevent
the use of legal compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn
communication offacts which would incriminate him. " '
Since the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that no
explicit or implicit factual declarations were conveyed to the
12 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
"Id. at 612-13.
", Id. at 610-12 (holding that the government had not compelled preparation of
the documents nor would the subpoena have required the defendant "to restate, re-
peat, or affirm the truth" of the documents contents. Since the documents would not




17 Id. at 614-15.
487 U.S. 201 (1988).
5' Id. at 202.
60 Id. at 203.
61 Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
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government, the documents were not "testimonial"'2 and,
hence, not protected under the Fifth Amendment. s
B. HISTORY OF IMMUNITY UNDER 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 6002, 6003
The Fifth Amendment grants a right against self-
incrimination, but that right is not an absolute right not to pro-
vide testimony.6' The government can still compel the witness
to produce testimony or documents but must offer immunity in
return for the testimony.Gs Specifically, if a witness refuses to
provide testimony on the ground that she will incriminate her-
self, then the court can require the witness to testify, but
no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, ex-
cept a prosecution for perur% giving a false statement, or otherwise fail-
ing to comply with the order.
While section 6002 created "use and derivative use" immu-
nity in 1970, prior to that year, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Counselman v. Hitchcock only allowed "transactional" immunity.
Whereas "transactional" immunity provides "absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates,"ts "use and derivative use" immunitX only provides pro-
tection for any use of just that testimony. Thus, if new evi-
dence arises in the case, independent of the testimony, it is
possible for prosecution of the witness to continue under "use
and derivative use" immunity, while the prosecution would be
forbidden under "transactional" immunity. Kastigar v. United
States ° clarified the difference between "transactional" immunity
Id. at 215.
63Id. at 219.
SeeMurphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
6s Id. at 79 ("[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be
compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the
compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials
in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.").
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
6 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1972).
63Id.
69 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
7 406 U.S. 441.
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and "use and derivative use" immunity, and overturned Coun-
selman in holding the latter to be constitutional'
In Counselman, the witness was brought in for questioning
regarding alleged violations of an act of Congress to regulate
commerce. 2  During the questioning regarding his business,
Counselman refused to answer some questions on the ground
that he may incriminate himself.13 After a court found that
Counselman's reasons for not testifying were insufficient, he was
again called before a grand jury to answer questions. 4 Upon his
refusal to answer the questions, the court found Counselman in
contempt of court.75 The Circuit Court found that since section
860 of the Revised Statutes granted Counselman "use" immunity
for his testimony, his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated
and he was compelled to answer the questions. The Supreme
Court held that Section 860 of the Revised Statutes was not con-
stitutional since it did "not supply a complete protection from
all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was
designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibi-
tion. 77 The Court concluded that a valid statute must offer ab-
solute immunity from future prosecution.78
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission.79 The defendants were subpoenaed and requested
to answer questions regarding a work stoppage at a harbor
pier.0 After refusing to testify, the defendants were granted
immunity under New York and New Jersey state law, but still re-
fused to testify.8' The defendants asserted that the immunity
provided the states did not protect them from federal law, un-
der which they might be incriminated.2 The court found the
defendants guilty of both criminal and civil contempt.' 3 The
71 Id.
7 142 U.S. at 548.
Id. at 549.
7' Id. at 550.
"' Id. at 552.
76 Id. at 559-60.
7 Id. at 585-86.
78 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1972).
7 378 U.S. 52.
80 Id. at 53.
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New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the civil contempt ruling,
and held that the defendants can be compelled to produce tes-
timony that could be used in a federal prosecution.
The Court held that the Constitution protected a witness
under both state and federal law.' Therefore, the witness is not
required to give testimony "unless the compelled testimony and
its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in
connection with a criminal prosecution."O The Court decided
that this protection against both state and federal prosecution
would leave the witness in "substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state
grant of immunity."
The Counselman ruling remained constitutionally valid until
Kastigar when the Court first analyzed 18 U.S.C. sections 6002
and 6003." In Kastigar, the government called upon petitioners
to testify before a United States grandjury6 Believing that peti-
tioners would assert their Fifth Amendment right not to in-
criminate themselves, the government sought and received an
order compelling the petitioners to testify under a grant of im-
munity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sections 6002 and 6003.- Peti-
tioners contended that immunity under the order was not
coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination, and
therefore refused to answer questions.9' The District court
found the petitioners to be in contempt of court and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.92 The Supreme Court was only asked to
decide whether "use and derivative use" immunity was constitu-
tional or whether "transactional" immunity must be provided to
compel testimony.93
In holding that "use and derivative use" immunity is coex-
tensive with the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court
stated that immunity under 18 U.S.C. section 6002 "prohibits
the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testi-
4 id.
"Id. at 77-78.
66 Id at 79.
7Id.







mony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony
cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the wit-
ness."'94 Because the testimony could not be used in any way
against the witnesses, the Court found that the immunity
granted under "use and derivative use" was consistent with the
basis of the Counselman decision.5
Holding that section 6002 satisfied the requirement in Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Commission that immunity must leave the wit-
ness "in substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immu-
nity,, 96 the Court decided that "use and derivative use" immunity
did not violate the Fifth Amendment and therefore was consti-
tutional.9 7
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 5, 1994, the Special Divisiongs granted power to
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate whether any
individual had committed any violation of federal crime relating
to the Whitewater Development Corporation ("Whitewater")
incident or the investigation connected to that incident."
Shortly after this grant of power, the Independent Counsel re-
quested and received an explicit expansion of his jurisdiction to
include an investigation of Webster Hubbell. 00 On December 6,
"Id at 453.
95 .d.
Murphy held that immunity granted under states law must also hold for prosecu-
tion under federal law. 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
97 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
' The Special Division is a panel of three judges used to appoint Independent
Counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 49.
9United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27 (D.D.C. 1998). The Whitewater
incident involved overextended loans made by Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan
Association and the shifting of funds between corporations including the Whitewater
Development Corporation. During these activities, Madison Guaranty retained the
services of the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock, Arkansas, for which Mr. Hubbell used to
work. Thus, Hubbell's involvement in the incident was as Madison's counsel. See
Jerry Seper and FrankJ. Murray, Clintons to Release Real Estate Documents White House
Reverses Stand as Probe into Deal Continues, WASH. PosT, Dec. 24, 1993, at Al.
"0 However, the United States District Court observed that while Independent
Counsel sought and received expansion of it power by permission of the Special Divi-
sion, the Special Division has no power to "expand" the jurisdiction of the original
grant of power. Hubbell 11 F. Supp. 2d, at 28 n. 4.
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1994, Hubbell pleaded guilty to mail fraud and tax evasion, after
charges for fraudulent billings were brought against him by the
Independent Counsel.' °' Hubbell began serving his twenty-one
month sentence on August 7, 1995. ' 02
While Hubbell was serving his sentence, the Independent
Counsel served him with a subpoena to produce "all his busi-
ness, financial, and tax records from January 1, 1993 to the date
of the subpoena."10 3 Hubbell refused to cooperate asserting that
the Fifth Amendment precluded him from incriminating him-
self." The Independent Counsel responded by moving for an
order compelling production of the documents.'C The United
States District Court granted this motion ' o in accordance with
18 U.S.C. section 6002, which grants the defendant "immunity
to the extent allowed by law."'0 7 Relying on this immunity, Hub-
bell produced 13,120 pages of documents pursuant to the sub-108
poena.
On January 6, 1998, Independent Counsel requested the
authority to investigate whether Hubbell or any other individual
committed any tax violations regarding Hubbell's income since
1994.' 09 Following this request and relying heavily on the docu-
ments that Hubbell had produced, a grand jury handed down
indictments a ainst Hubbell and three others relating to the tax
law violations.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 1, 1998, Hubbell filed a motion to dismiss the in-
dictments against him."' The District Court granted this mo-




'3 Id. at 33.
104 Id.
105 Id.
" 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
,"' Hubbell 11 F. Supp. 2d, at 33.
'9 Id. at 28.
1I0 1&
.' Four motions to dismiss were actually filed by the defendants. The first, and fo-
cus of this note is the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the indictment was a vio-
lation of the "use" immunity granted to Hubbell under 18 U.S.C. § 6002. The second
motion to dismiss was sought on the grounds that the indictment mas beyond the ju-
risdiction of the Independent Counsel. While the district court originally granted
this motion, the court of appeals reversed this ruling and no party has sought further
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don on the ground that the government had turned the defen-
dant into the "primary informant against himself' by compelling
the production of the documents.'2 The court relied on its de-
termination that all of the evidence that the Independent
Counsel would have brought aginst the defendant was derived
from the produced documents.
The District Court acknowledged that the three testimonial
aspects of the act of production are existence, possession, and
authenticity, as determined in Fisher v. Unites States."4 It further
noted "[e]ven if one or more of those testimonial aspects is in-
criminating, the Fifth Amendment privilege does not attach un-
less it, or they, add to the 'sum total of the government's
information."" The Independent Counsel admitted that the
documents Hubbell produced added to the "sum total" of the
government's information about the crimes."6 The court rea-
soned that the government's argument insisting that the docu-
ments were valid to use so long as no fact finder learned how
the documents were produced was not practical because it ig-
nored the question of existence."
7
The government appealed the decision of the district
court."" The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the dis-
trict and remanded for further proceedings.' The Court of
Appeals concluded that the District Court incorrectly based its
decision on whether the government had previous knowledge
of the contents of the documents that Hubbell produced. 20
The majority argued that "[t]he inquiry should have focused
upon whether the government knew that the documents existed
at all, and not upon whether the government knew of the exis-
review of that issue. The third and forth motions to dismiss specific counts of the in-
dictment, a motion to dismiss for failure to state an offense and a motion to dismiss
for failure to comply with the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994,
were denied by the trial court. Hubbel4 11 F. Supp. 2d, at 37-38. Hence, the immu-
nity question was the only issue to reach the Supreme Court.
112 Id.
"' Id. at 34.
,, Id. at 35. SeeFisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11.
" Hubbell 11 F. Supp. 2d, at 35 (citing Fisher, 425 at 410-11).
"' Id. at 37.
,,
7 Id. at 35.
.. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
.. Id. at 554.
'2 Id. at 580.
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tence of the information contained therein." 2' It specifically
addressed and dismissed the Independent Counsel's claim that
the existence of the documents was a "forgone conclusion"
since all businesses and people generally possess records. 22 In
rejecting this argument, the majority clarified that previous Su-
preme Court decisions "require actual knowledge rather than
mere inductive generalizations. " '23 The Independent Counsel
also claimed that it had actual knowledge of the documents.'2'
The Court of Appeals majority could not answer that question
with the record before them, so it remanded the case to deter-
mine the extent of the government's knowledge of the exis-
tence of the documents prior to the subpoena.'2
Judge Williams wrote in dissent.'^ His opinion discussed
the Independent Counsel's knowledge of the documents prior
to Hubbell's act of production.'7 The opinion criticized the
majority for concluding that all document production is testi-
monial in its nature, when some document production can ac-
tually be non-testimonial.'28 In fact, Judge Williams asserted that
"[i]nformation as to the existence of the pieces of paper turned
over by a subpoenaed party can always be traced to non-
testimonial information."
Specifically, Williams looked at Fisher as evidence that the
Supreme Court did not want to follow the custom of declaring
all information-gathering actions as testimonial.'" Instead, the
dissent offered that the Supreme Court only provides Fifth
Amendment protection when the suspect is turned into a
"source of 'real or physical evidence."" 3  The dissent also criti-
cized the majority for its concentration on the "foregone con-
121 Id.
'




'24 Id. at 572.
12 Id. at 581.
126 There were actually two dissenting opinions and one concurring opinion.
However, the concurring opinion and other dissenting opinion related to the Court
of Appeals decision regarding Independent Counsel's jurisdiction and is thus moot
for the purposes of this note. See supra note 109.
27 167 F.3d at 597 (Williams,J., dissenting).
'
2 Id (Williams,J, dissenting).
'id. (WilliamsJ, dissenting).
Id. at 598. (Williams, J., dissenting).




clusion" theory, when in fact "forgone conclusions" are merely
part of a broader group of instances where "sources independ-
ent of testimonial aspects of the compulsion fully account for
the prosecutor's evidence.' 32 The opinion continued that since
the prosecutor relied only on the information within the docu-
ments, the "communicative aspect of the act of delivery is ...
redundant." 
3
The dissent found no basis for the majority's argument that
compulsion of mental faculties of the suspect is testimonial,
while evidence that merely uses the body is not.' Williams used
Baltimore Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, s5 where the de-
fendant was forced to turn over a child as evidence, to establish
that non-testimonial evidence should not be restricted to "the
body of the accused.' 36 Furthermore, the dissent observed that
it would be absurd to require the government to describe in de-
tail in the subpoena what it wanted the defendant to produce,
because then the ,government would have no need for the
documents anyway.' Williams concluded his opinion by stating
that as long as the government relied only on the contents of
the documents and not the means by which they were pro-
duced, as the government did here, then there has been no
Fifth Amendment violation.1ss
On remand to the lower court, the Independent Counsel
stated that it could not meet the requirement established by the
Court of Appeals.'39 The Independent Counsel and Hubbell
then entered into a conditional plea agreement that provided
for the dismissal of the charges, unless the Supreme Court de-
cided that the "act of production immunity" provided to the de-
fendant would not pose a "significant bar to his prosecution. ' 1'
However, the plea agreement called for a guilty plea by the de-
fendant if the Supreme Court sided with the government.""
,12 Id. at 598 (Williams,J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 599 (Williams,J, dissenting).
'M Id. at 600.
"5493 U.S. 549 (1990).
"5167 F.3d at 600 (williams,J., dissenting).
137 Id.
"1I Id.
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The Supreme Court granted the Independent Counsel's peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari to review the matter.4 2
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. 4 1 In its opinion, written by Justice Stevens,14
the majority reviewed a brief history of self-incrimination pro-
tection under the Fifth Amendment. The Court's review in-
cluded the narrow protection awarded, what types of documents
are protected, and when the Fifth Amendment protects them.'
The Court then looked specifically at the history and scope of
the "use and derivative use" immunity granted under 18 U.S.C.
section 6002.4 Following this, the Court focused on the testi-
monial aspects of Hubbell's production of the documents.'
4 7
Finally, the court concluded that since the defendant's act of
production was protected under the Fifth Amendment, the gov-
ernment had violated his grant of immunity and the charges
should be dismissed.'48
The majority opinion began by defining "witness," insofar as
it concerned the Fifth Amendment, as applying only to those
communications "that are 'testimonial' in character."' ° The
majority recognized the observation of Justice Holmes that
"there is a significant difference between the use of compulsion
to extort communications from a defendant and compelling a
person to engage in conduct that may be incriminating."'s9 The
majority further clarified Fifth Amendment protection by stat-
ing that Hubbell may not claimprotection merely because the
documents were incriminating.' Instead he may only claim
142 Id.
'43 120 S. Ct. at 2048.
'. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas all
joined in the opinion. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.
120 S. Ct. at 2043-44.
Id. at 2044.




5 Id. (citingHolt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-253 (1910)).
... Id. at 2043.
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protection if by producing the documents, he "implicitly com-
municate [s] 'statements of facts. ' '"5 2
Despite this requirement, the majority noted that producing
documents in response to a subpoena may have a compelled
testimonial aspect. The Court had previously held that "'the
act of production' itself may implicitly communicate 'statements
of fact."""' By producing the documents, the defendant would
be admitting that the documents existed, were authentic, and
were in his possession or control. 5 5 Including this case in par-
ticular, the Court noted that the defendant who responds to a
subpoena often is required to testify as to whether he produced
everything required by the subpoena.' 56
The majority then eliminated the possibility that Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects only
compelled testimony that is used against the defendant at
trial. 57 Citing Hoffman v. United States,' the majority adhered to
the principle that the Fifth Amendment provides protection
"against the prosecutor's use of incriminating information derived
directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony of the re-
spondent."'5 9
In the next portion of the opinion, the majority reiterated
the constitutionality of "use and derivative use" immunity."W Fo-
cusing on Kastigar v. United States,'6' the majority recognized that
"full transactional immunity" is no longer required, so long as
the immunity granted protects against future prosecution estab-
lished upon the knowledge and information gained from the
compelled testimony.' 62 Furthermore, the majority restated that
the prosecution has the affirmative duty "'to prove that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source




156 Id at 2044.
57 Id.
'm 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
... 120 S. Ct. at 2044 (emphasis added).
160 id.
16' 406 U.S. 441 (1971).
162 120 S. Ct. at 2045.
'63Id. (citingKastigar, 406 U.S. at 460).
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that the compelled testimony in this case is not the content of
the documents but rather the act of producing the documents,
the majority continued its opinion by addressing the testimonial
aspects of producing documents under a subpoena."A
For the remainder of the opinion, the majority assumed
that the government would have been able to prove the exis-
tence, authenticity, and possession of any of the documents
without Hubbell's act of production.'O Justice Stevens denied
the ability of the government to introduce the produced docu-
ments into evidence, as it would be a violation of the "use" im-
munity granted under 18 U.S.C. section 6002.'6 However, he
allowed that a question still existed as to whether the govern-
ment had violated Hubbell "derivative use" immunity by using
the documents to obtain an indictment and prepare for trial.'
The majority decided that the government had infringed upon
the immunity granted to Hubbell."6s
The majority began its discussion of this topic by identifying
its belief that the government needed the documents produced
by respondent "both to identify potential sources of information
and to produce those sources." r69 Justice Stevens found it "un-
deniable" that the catalog of documents "could provide a prose-
cutor with a 'lead to incriminating evidence,' or 'a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute.'" r The majority relied
on the record of the District Court to reach this decision.
The opinion continued that since the indictment charged
crimes different than those suspected in the subpoena, the gov-
ernment obviously relied on the documents as the "first step in
a chain of evidence."'72 The documents the government used
for the indictment were not in the possession of the government
before the subpoenatm In fact, the government did not know of
these criminal violations until after the defendant underwent
the mental and physical steps to produce the documents under







'7' Supra note 114.




the order of the District Court.' 74 The majority followed Curcio
v. United States'7W 5 in declaring that the defendant used his mind
to produce and identify all the documents required by the sub-
poena.17 6 The Court held that it was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination to require a defen-
dant to answer questions regarding the existence of potentially
incriminating pieces of evidence.'
77
Once the majority decided that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tected against a defendant answering such questions, and it ap-
plied the same principle to the testimonial act of responding to
a subpoena.178 The majority dismissed the government's notion
that even though Hubbell's act of production did have a testi-
monial aspect, the existence and possession of the documents
was a "foregone conclusion."'9 The majority distinguished
Fisher on the ground that the government in that case knew that
the documents sought existed and were authentic.'80 The ma-
jority continued that no such similarity existed in this case."'
Furthermore, Justice Stevens declared that the government
could not rely on the "overbroad argument that a businessman
such as respondent will always possess general business and tax
records that fall within the broad categories described in this
subpoena.",
8 1
With these discoveries, the majority concluded that the "act
of production had a testimonial aspect, at least with respect to
the existence and location of the documents."' Therefore, un-
der Kastigar, since the government could not make a showing
that all evidence used in obtaining the indictment was derived
from sources "wholly independent" of the testimonial aspect of
the act of production, the Court dismissed the charges against
Hubbell. 8 1
, Id. at 2046-47.
', 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
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B. DISSENTING OPINION
In a one-line dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with
the dissent written by Judge Williams for the Court of Appeals.'
C. CONCURRING OPINION
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Thomas,'
agreed with the decision of the Court, but did not feel the
analysis of testimonial aspects of the act of production was nec-
essary.'" Thomas differed from the opinion of the majority in
his belief that the current self-incrimination doctrine strays
from the "original meaning of the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause."'t  Thomas believed that the Fifth
Amendment was originally intended to protect a defendant
from compelled production of any incriminating evidence."9
While noting that the language of the Fifth Amendment ac-
tually uses the word "witness," Thomas suggested that "witness"
has a broader meaning than the majority acknowledged.' The
majority equated "witness" with testimony, and therefore only al-
lowed protection under the Fifth Amendment for communica-
tions "that are 'testimonial' in character." 9' However, the word
"witness" historically meant a "person who gives or furnishes
evidence." 92 In support for this contention, Thomas cited vari-
ous legal and general dictionaries that were contemporary to
the writing of the Constitution.19 3 With this broader definition,
a defendant who responds to a subpoena by producing docu-
ments is clearly a "witness. ' 94
In further support of his assertion, Justice Thomas cited the
"history and framing of the Fifth Amendment."' The common
law before the formation of the Constitution included self-
" Id. at 2050 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 126-138 and accompa-
nying text for discussion ofJudge Williams's dissent.
'8Jusfice Scaliajoined in the concurring opinion.
18 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2050 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
"'Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
... Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
'Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
Id. at 2051 (Thomas,J., concurring). See e.g., 2 G.JACOB, A NE%- L% w-Dicno.NAr"
(8th ed. 1762); 2T. CUNNINGHAM, NEWAND COMLpETE LAW-DiCnONARY (2d ed. 1771).
'United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2050 (2000) (ThomasJ., concurring).
Id. at 2051 (Thomas,J., concurring).
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incrimination protection against the compelled production of
any incriminating evidence"90 Thomas also mentioned legisla-
tion that protected a defendant's right not to produce any in-
criminating evidence instead of merely testimony.1 97 Justice
Thomas specifically noted that eight of the original thirteen
states had clauses in their constitutions that prevented com-
pelled production of evidence.' 9 In addition, Thomas revealed
that the four original states to propose a bill of rights included a
self-incrimination protection clause that used the word "evi-
dence."' 9 James Madison, in writing the Fifth Amendment, sub-
stituted the phrase "to be a witness" from the suggested
proposals. 200 Due to the history of self-incrimination privilege
and the meaning of the word "witness," Thomas felt it was likely
that Madison changed the wording without wishing to change
the meaning of the protection. 2D' The concurrence suggested
that this explains why there was no opposition to the switch.
20 2
Justice Thomas also analogized the use of the word "wit-
ness" in the Fifth Amendment with its use in the Sixth Amend-
ment.25  Citing United States v. Burr,2 Thomas stated that the
Sixth Amendment allows a defendant to bring any evidence to
his defense. 20 5 Thus, a narrow definition of "witness" would not
follow the ruling in Burr.20 6
Finally, the concurrence concluded by acknowledging that
Fisher rejected the decision in Boyd.267 However, the opinion ad-
vanced that the Fisher court did not properly adhere to the
precedent set by Boyd or follow the historical meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.2°6 Therefore, Thomas stated that while the
Court correctly decided the instant case, at a future date, he
'9 Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
197 Id. (ThomasJ., concurring).
Id. at 2051-52 (ThomasJ, concurring).




'-' Id. at 2053 (ThomasJ, concurring).
25 F. Gas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
" United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2053 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Specifically, the court allowed the defendant the right to secure papers. 25 F. Cas. at
34-35.
Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2053 (Thomas,J, concurring).
Id. (Thomas,J, concurring).
Id. at 2054. (Thomas,J., concurring).
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might be forced to reevaluate Fisher and the historical meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.20
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Hubbell,30 correctly
dismissed the indictment against the defendant because the
government violated 18 U.S.C. section 6002 when it used the
documents that defendant was compelled to produce to obtain
the indictment.211 First, in making its decision, the Court held
that the defendant's act of production was testimonial and
therefore protected under the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination clause.1 2 The decision is consistent with the
precedent of previous Supreme Court cases; however, it is not
consistent with the historical intent of the Fifth Amendment.
213
Furthermore, problems arise when determining whether evi-
dence is testimonial and thus protected under self-
incrimination. 4 The majority's decision to analyze whether the
defendant's act of production was testimonial in its nature fur-
ther complicates an area of law where no definite rule exists. ' 5
The Court should have reconsidered the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and restored it to its original
broad scope of protection.1 6 Secondly, the government prop-
erly extended the "derivative" immunity protection to include
the documents themselves and not just the act of producing
them.1 7 The majority's decision on this issue is consistent with
the case law precedent and original intent of the statute.38 Also,
the analysis used by the majority reiterates a bright line test pre-
viously used by the Court to determine whether the prosecution
has violated "use and derivative use" immunity, thus setting a
clear standard for future courts.
2Y9
2 Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
210 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
211 Id. at 204648.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 2050-52 (Thomas,J, concurring).
1 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 774 (1966) (BlackJ., dissenting).
"' Charles Gardner Geyh, The Testimonial Component of the Right Agatnst
Self-Incrimination, 36 CA T. U. L. REV. 611, 635 (1987).
2,1 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2050 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring).
217 Id. at 2047-48.
218 See infra § V.B.
2
"
9Hubbel 120 S. CL at 2048.
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A. ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ACT OF PRODUCING DOCUMENTS WAS
PROTECTED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Eight of nine Supreme Court Justices felt that Hubbell's
production of documents under immunity granted by 18 U.S.C.
section 6002 was testimonial in its nature. While the concur-
rence felt that the test for testimony was futile since the Fifth
Amendment protects all incriminating evidence, 2 it agreed that
the majority correctly analyzed the defendant's response to the
subpoena under existing case law.2 The majority noted that
Doe If 2l supports it claim that evidence must be testimonial for
the privilege of self-incrimination to apply.224  In Doe II, the
Court ruled that the self-incrimination privilege only applies to
incriminating communication of facts. This principal is con-
sistent with earlier Supreme Court cases as well. 2 In Schmerber,
for instance, the Court ruled that "the [self-incrimination] privi-
lege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testi-
mony.,227
After the majority decided that the documents themselves
might not be protected, it proceeded to analyze whether the act
of production was protected.228  Relying again on Doe II, the
Court concluded that the act of production "may communicate
information about the existence, custody, and authenticity of
the documents," and therefore may be testimonial.2  In Fisher,
the Court admitted that the act may be testimonial because it
"tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and
their possession or control. 2 ' 0 The act of production may be
testimonial by itself, but it is almost certainly testimonial when it
requires the defendant to take the stand and testify that he has
produced everything required.23'
220 id.
"2 Id. at 2050 (ThomasJ, concurring).
Id. at 2042-43.
Doe v. United States ("Doe II"), 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988).
22 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000).
Doe II, 487 U.S. at 212.
See also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-71
(1976).
27 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S 757, 764 (1966).
2" Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2044.
22 Id. (citing Doe II, 487 U.S. at 209-10.).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
231 Hubbel4 120 S. Ct. at 2044.
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While the theory is grounded in valid law, the majority
never explained why, in this case, the act of production was tes-
timonial. The majority opinion moved from determining that
the act may be testimonial to assuming that it was testimonial:
"It is the Fifth Amendment's protection against the prosecutor's
use of incriminating information derived directly or indirectly
from the compelled testimony of the respondent that is of pri-
mary relevance in this case."2 s This is especially problematic as
this issue is where the appellate court dissent disagrees with the
majority.2
Although the majority made no explicit finding that the act
of production was testimonial, its reasoning was superior to that
of the dissent. The dissent rested its decision on the assumption
that the existence of documents can be traced to non-
testimonial information.23 In doing this, however, the dissent
disregarded the holding of Doe I for two reasons, neither of
which are soundY2 First, the dissent argued that the ruling in
Doe I was a decision that upheld the fact finding of the lower
court and not the law. 7 However, as the Court of Appeals ma-
jority noted, this distinction did not affect the legal holding of
the case.m
Secondly, the dissent argued that the Court held that pro-
duction of documents could provide evidence of authenticity
but never stated production of documents could prove exis-
tence, which was the only issue in the current case 9  Once
more, the majority suggested that the dissent misread the case
and that production of documents could admit existence and
possession.2 40 As the specific language of Doe I states, "[w] ith few
exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [re-
spondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic., 24' Thus, the dissent
2 Id. at 2044.
Id. (emphasis added).
' United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams. J., dis-
senting).
2" See supra note 126-138 and accompanying text.
" Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 570, n.24.
Id. at 599 (Williams,J., dissenting).
Id. at 570, n.24.
29 Id. at 599 (Williams,J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 571, n.24.
211 United States v. Doe ("Doe I"), 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.l1 (1984) (citing In the Mat-
ter of the GrandJury Empanelled, 541 F. Supp. 1,3 (D. N.J. 1981)).
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failed to distinguish or nullify a valid precedent.242 Further-
more, the dissent neglected to account for the verbal testimony
that Hubbell provided along with the produced documents.
2 3
The dissent ignored the authenticity and possession aspects of
testimony that Fisher requires.2 "
While the majority opinion reaches the correct decision, the
opinion is not flawless. First, the approach of the majority is in-
consistent with the historical intent of the Fifth Amendment.
24 5
Secondly, looking at whether evidence is "testimonial" does not
create a clear precedent and therefore may create future prob-
lems.2"
As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence, recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, including this one, appear to be
contrary to the historical meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
211
The historical meaning of the Constitution at the time of its en-
actment is important because it is the public understanding and
meaning that counts.2 8 The Constitution should be analyzed in
a manner similar to how the public would have interpreted it
when it was written.219 As Justice Thomas's opinion stated, dur-
ing the time period when the Bill of Rights was passed, "witness"
was defined as a "giver of evidence. " 2° Thus, the two words were
nearly synonymous. The similarity between the words was seen
in 1789, when John Laurence questioned Madison's suggested
amendment that no one shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.25' In arguing that the amendment be limited to
criminal cases, Laurence referred to the proposal as the one
'2 Hubbell 167 F.3d at 571, n.24.
211 See United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 1998). (The district
court found that Hubbell made communications regarding the authenticity, posses-
sion, and existence of the documents.)
244 See supra note 45.
211 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2050 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
246 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 774 (1966) (BlackJ, dissenting).
21 Hubbe4 120 S. Ct. at 2052 (Thomas, J., concurring).
24 ROBERT H. BORx, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLMCAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw, 143-46 (1990).
249 Id.
25 United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2051 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring);
see e.g. 2 G. JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICrIONARY (8th ed. 1762); 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, NEW AND
COMPLETE LAw-DICrIONARY (2d ed. 1771).
" LEvW, supra note 28, at 424.
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where "a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself."
52
As time went by, however, the definition of "witness"
changed into "one who testifies to what he has seen, heard, or
otherwise observed. " s"3 This may account for why the Schmerber
Court required that evidence be testimonial before it may be
protected. 4  However, it still appears to be contrary to the
original intent of the Fifth Amendment to provide protection at
least as broad as was provided under English common law.' As
further proof, Thomas cited to the legislative materials from the
writing of the Constitution to verify that the writers of the Con-
stitution indeed included the word "witness" to mean all evi-
dence. 6
Although these sources illustrate Thomas's argument, per-
haps the most persuasive evidence in favor of original intent is
the Court's early decisions such as Boyd v. United States, ' 7 Coun-
selman v. Hitchcockm and Gouled v. United States. 9 While Coun-
selman and Gouled have since been overturned, all three of these
cases, as early analyses of the Fifth Amendment, set the meaning
and interpretation for the phrase "to be a witness."to Even
though the Court has held many aspects of Boyd to be invalid,
thus not following the precedent set, it has never overruled
Boyd.261 Instead, it has "carved exceptions out of the analysis in
Boyd," such as eliminating self-incrimination protection for
"non-testimonial" evidence and business records."o All that ap-
pears to be left of Boyd is its protection of private papers.2" Un-
til the Court officially overturns and reverses its decision in Boyd,
22 Id.
"JosEPH R. NOLAN &jAcQUEUNE M. NOLAN-HALEY, BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY, (6th
ed. 1990).
' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
2LEY, supra note 28, at 428.
2' Hubbel, 120 S. Ct. at 2051 (Thomas, J., concurring). See e.g. J. STORY,
COENTARIES ON THE CONSTrnON OF THE UNITED STATES § 931 (1833); 2 DEmxTES
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (J. Elliot 2d ed., 1854) (Mr. Holmes, Mass., Jan.
30, 1788).
27 116 U.S. at 633-34.
142 U.S. at 566.
2" 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1920).
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 775-76 (BlackJ., dissenting).
In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1067-68 tS.D.N.Y.
1990).




however, it is ignoring the earliest case interpreting Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
Besides failing to follow the original intent of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court also missed an opportunity to clarify a
rule that has created policy problems and confusion.'" The
Court followed precedent in holding that an act of producing
documents needs to be a compelled testimonial communication
before it is provided protection under the Fifth Amendment.
2
The problem with this approach is that there is not an exact or
definite test to determine if an act is testimonial .2  The Schmer-
ber court based its decision on "[h]istory and a long line of
authorities in lower courts."267 However, that Court never ex-
plained why or how it chose the "testimonial aspect" ap-
proach.2ss Furthermore, the majority in Schmerber did not take
into consideration the "significant minority of jurisdictions"
which had held conversely.2  This "failure to offer any guidance
as to what distinguishes sufficiently testimonial acts from insuffi-
ciently testimonial acts leaves the impV ression that its decisions
on the question are purely arbitrary.
This approach used by the Court lacks "clarity and preci-
sion."2 7' The problem is even further evidenced by the "labored
explication" that each Supreme Court decision has gone
272
through in recent decisions involving the same issue. The
same historical issues and holdings regarding the testimonial
aspects of compelled production are discussed in nearly every
Fifth Amendment compelled production case, because there ex-
ists no bright line test for the Court to enforce. 73
Furthermore, the reasons behind the institution of the "tes-
timonial aspects" test appear to have derived not from case law
Geyh, supra note 215, at 635.
Hubbek 120 S. Ct. at 2042. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761; Doe, 487 U.S. at
212.
266 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (BlackJ, dissenting).
217 Id. at 762-63.
m
6 Id.
2" Geyh, supra note 215, at 622.
27' Id. at 635.
2' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (BlackJ, dissenting).
'r Id. Justice Black's dissent observation of a "labored explication" specifically
concerns just the Schmerber majority, but no Court since Schmerber has attempted to
elucidate the problem.
23 See, e.g., Hubbel, 120 S. Ct at 2042-43; United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-13; Doe
v. United States, 487 U.S. at 209-10.
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precedent, but from a secondary legal source: Wigmore on Evi-
dence, which when analyzed deeper, does not prove persua-
sive 4 Wiginore put forth three major explanations for why
documents must have testimonial aspects to be protected under
the self-incrimination privilege.27
The first reason is in response to "the process of the ecclesi-
astical court" which relied on putting the defendant upon the
stand under oath.27 6 This concern is not as prevalent today as it
was during the 1700s because the justice system has changed to
include more physical evidence instead of relying mostly on oral
accounts.2n
Secondly, requiring "testimonial" evidence helped "stimu-
late the prosecution to a full and fair search for evidence pro-
curable by their own exertions."278 However, this reason seems
ineffective and unnecessary since the right exists to ensure that
the prosecution alone obtains any evidence. Thus, under this
reason, it would be inappropriate to garner any evidence from
the suspect regardless of whether it is testimonial.m
The final reason Wigmore used for suggesting a "testimo-
nial aspects" test is a policy argument.2m Without the testimonial
requirement, Wigmore believed all evidence would be protected
and therefore the prosecution would never be able to form a
case against the defendant. 8 However, this reason misinter-
prets the protection of the self-incrimination privilege. The
privilege only applies to the compelled cooperation of the de-
fendant and does not apply to the independent investigation of
the police.282 Hence the prosecution could still form cases
against the defendant, so long as the police conducted the in-
vestigation without any assistance from the suspect.2
All of the reasons Wigmore used to establish a testimonial
requirement in the evidence are either irrelevant or outdated.3
' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Blackj, dissenting).












Since the foundation for the rule has been rendered illegiti-
mate, the Court should either abandon the rule or find other
support for it. Justice Thomas's suggestion provides the answer.
It eliminates the need for a discussion of whether the act of
production has a "testimonial aspect."'2s Thomas calls for a re-
turn to the broad protection of the self-incrimination clause
that was seen both in the original intent of the Fifth Amend-
ment 2 6 and reaffirmed in Boyd.287 Thomas's approach provides
protection under the Fifth Amendment for any production of
documents.288 His rule is consistent with the literal meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, as it was when it was 
written in 1793.2s f
Although the definitions of "evidence" and "witness" have
diverged over the years, causing a slight change in the meaning
of the words, the framers of the Constitution did not include
the requirement that evidence be testimonial in the Fifth
Amendment.20 Neither was there any mention of the "testimo-
nial" requirement in any of the proposals, debates, or similarly
written state bills of rights.21 Instead, that requirement devel-
oped out of scholarly legal authority2 and a change in vocabu-
lary,23 thus providing no legal precedent for its establishment.
Furthermore, Justice Thomas's method creates a lucid,
comprehensible rule for future courts to obey.21 Instead of ana-
lyzing whether evidence is testimonial, the only question the
courts will have to decide is whether the defendant produced
the evidence. The current line of analysis, a determination of
whether the production was testimonial, has problems as evi-
denced at the Court of Appeals. 5 Justice Thomas's suggested
method, however, leaves no discretion to the courts or judges,
which eliminates the possibility of split decisions. Instead, any
... 120 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (Thomas,J, concurring).
2'6 See, e.g., 2 DEBATEs ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrIUMON 111 (J. Elliot 2d ed., 1865).
217 See generally 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2" 120 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (Thomas,J, concurring).
239 id
See generally BERGER, supra note 10; LEVY, supra note 28.
291 Id.
Geyh, supra note 215, at 629-30.
"' Hubbell 120 S. Ct. at 2042 (The majority defines "witness" as it was used in re-
cent cases and scholarly authority.)
2" Id. at 2050; see also supra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
2" Compare the majority view, 167 F.3d at 570-72 (that the production was testi-
monial) with Judge Williams's dissent, 167 F.3d at 597-600 (that the production was
not testimonial).
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evidence that the witness produces will be protected under the
Fifth Amendment, similar to the protection provided by the
amendment at its conception.2"
B. ISSUE OF WHETHER USE OF DOCUMENTS TO PRODUCE
INDICTMENT WAS VIOLATION OF "USE AND DERIVATIVE USE
IMMUNIT"
Whereas the majority reached the correct decision on the
issue of whether the act of production was protected under the
Fifth Amendment with flawed reasoning, it correctly decided
the issue of immunity in a well reasoned and clearly articulated
manner.27 The majority's decision that the prosecution's use of
the documents was a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 6002 is ideal
for two reasons. First, the decision is consistent with the histori-
cal purpose of earlier case law and the original intent of the leg-
islation. Second, the decision provides a clear framework for
future courts to decide the issue by creating a question of fact.Y
In its decision the majority held that the government vio-
lated the "derivative use" of the defendant's compelled produc-
tion in obtaining the indictment and using the documents to
gather other information that was not compelled production
from the defendant.3 0 The majority relied on the findings of
the District Court that the compelled production was "the first
step in a chain of evidence that led to this prosecution." 9' As
the opinion further noted, the immunity granted under section
6002 is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 2
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, the Court acknowledged
that "use and derivative use" immunity "leaves the witness and
the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed his privilege." 3 Hence the test estab-
lished by Murphy, and used by Kastigar and this Court, is
whether the prosecution can prove that they have an "inde-
23 120 S. CL at 2050 (ThomasJ, concurring).
2' 120 S. CL at 2045.
's SeePilsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 260-61 (1983).
See United States v. Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
3 120 S. Ct. at 2046
'Id.
" Id.
378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
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pendent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence.0"3 4 The
Hubbell majority then decided that since the Independent
Counsel did not assert that they could prove such a finding and,
in fact, admitted that they could not, the use of the produced
documents to obtain the indictment violated the "derivative
use" immunity of section 6002.305
The purpose of the "use and derivative use" immunity stat-
ute is to balance the fundamental privilege against self-
incrimination with the government's need to obtain informa-
tion through subpoenaed testimony.' °6 Even though the Court
has overruled Counselman with respect to its holding regarding
transactional immunity, it is important to remember the pur-
pose behind the Court's decision in that case.0 7 The Court
stated that the "use" immunity was invalid, because it did not of-
fer "complete protection from all perils against which the con-
stitutional prohibition was designed to guard."3 8 The "wholly
independent" test in Kastigar adheres to that central principal of
Counselman because it prevents the compelled testimony from
being used in a future prosecution.' °9
Since immunity will be violated if the prosecution cannot
prove that it could have obtained the evidence from a "wholly
independent" source, the defendant is offered the same protec-
tion as if he had claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege.3 0 In
fact, the protection under section 6002 may even be stronger
than the protection under the Fifth Amendment, because once
compelled testimony is shown, the government has "the heavy
burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was
derived from legitimate independent sources. 1 ' The Fifth
Amendment, on the other hand, first requires a voluntariness
hearing before the testimony becomes inadmissible.3 2  Thus,
this test does satisfy the concerns of Counselman.
0 id.
's 120 S. Ct. at 2048.
United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996).
o See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 586.
See supra note 78.
310 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 458-59.
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C. THE "WHOLLY INDEPENDENT" TEST ALSO SATISFIES THE
ORIGINAL INTENT OF SECTION 6002
The purpose of section 6002 was to limit the scope of im-
munity to the level that is constitutionally required, as well as to
limit the use of immunity to those cases in which the Attorney
General, or officials designated by him, determines that gaining
the witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for
criminal prosecution of that witness.
Thus, the prosecution can prosecute someone who gives
minimal or useless evidence under "use and derivative use" im-
munity whereas that prosecution was not available under "trans-
actional" mmunty. The problem of offering a witness
immunity to disclose his testimony only to find out that he has
no useful information is therefore eliminated."1 '
The "wholly independent" test protects the purpose of sec-
tion 6002 by allowing the government to determine which "wit-
ness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for
criminal prosecution," and in which situations the government
would rather prosecute the witness than use his testimony. 3 7 If
the government decides to prosecute someone whom they have
offered "use and derivative use" immunity to under section
6002, the "wholly independent" test allows them to continue in
such a prosecution subject to a showing of fact that they used• - 3181
other legitimate sources. If the prosecution can prove that its
sources are "wholly independent" of the witness's testimony,
then the prosecution can proceed as the nature and purpose of
section 6002 dictate.31 9
The decision in Hubbell was proper because it adhered to
the clear bright line test to decide whether the immunity had
been broken, as established in Kastigar.o For all its discussion
-,
4Pisbuy Co., 459 U.S. at 260-61.
"' See United States v. McGuire, 45 F.3d 1177, 1182-84 (8th Cir. 1995) (Court up-
held the conviction of defendantsJohn Macdacina relating to a murder even though
the defendant had provided testimony regarding gambling operations under section
6002 because a Kastigar hearing showed that the sources were "wholly independent"
of the compelled testimony).
-- See id.; United States v. Dynalectric Company, 859 F.2d. 1559 (11th Cir. 1988)
(Court upheld the conviction of defendant after it was determined that his testimony
provided no useful information).317 Id.
318 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (1972).
319 Pilsbury Co., 459 U.S. at 260-61.
" See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying ext.
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and debate over the immunity granted under section 6002, the
issue funnels down to one question: whether the evidence used
by the government to obtain the indictment was "wholly inde-
pendent" of the documents produced in response to the sub-
poena. 2 ' This Kastigar hearing creates a clear question of fact,
not a question of law, which any fact finder can determine.
Many district courts have used the "wholly independent" test
and Kastigar hearings to determine if prosecutors violated the
"derivative use" immunity that was granted to the defendants.
323
As it is purely a question of fact, the "wholly independent" test is
easy for district courts to use in determining whether the gov-
ernment has violated immunity or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court held that the Independent Counsel violated "use
and derivative use" immunity granted under 18 U.S.C. section
6002.24 In determining whether the defendant's act of produc-
tion was protected, the Court invoked the unfounded and out-
dated test of whether the evidence was testimonial.2 5 While the
Court reached the correct conclusion, it missed an opportunity
to either institute a new bright line test with which to use in the
future or return to the historical intent of the Fifth Amend-
ment.326 Contrarily, the Court followed a bright line test to de-
termine whether the government had violated a grant of
327 Himmunity. In Hubbell, the Court correctly provided Fifth
Amendment protection in a deserved situation but failed to
broaden the scope of that protection to help future witnesses.
Ryan McLennan
"2 Hubbell 120 S. Ct. at 2048.
' Dudden, 65 F.3d at 1469.
" The holding in Hubbell merely reiterated the rule of Kastigar. Hence, district
cases that have used the Kastigar hearing are evidentiary of the validity of the Hubbell
court. See, e.g., Dudden, 65 F.3d at 1469; McGuire, 45 F.3d at 1182-84; United States v.
Harris, 780 F. Supp. 385 (N.D.W.V. 1991); United States v. Stanfa, 1996 WL 417168
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
324 Hubbell 120 S. Ct. at 2047-48.
"2 Geyh, supra note 215, 624-26.
'26 Hubbel4 120 S. Ct. at 2050-54 (Thomas,J., concurring).
'2 Id. at 2047-48.
[Vol. 91
